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Abstract. This study examines the influence of public sector unions on the expansion of the public 
sector. Based on public goods theory, our paper models how unions influence the supply of and 
demand for public sector activities. On the demand side, public sector unions are special interests 
which advocate public sector expansion to policy makers; on the supply side, they exert pressure 
to maintain and expand monopoly powers. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a posi­
tive relationship exists between public sector unionism and public spending. 
1. Introduction 
Over this century, the public sector (all levels of government) in the United 
States has grown from approximately 10 to 35070 of gross domestic product. 
Little or no attention, however, has been given to how public sector unions af­
fect public sector expansion. Public sector unionism, unlike unionism in the 
private sector, has been sharply rising. In the early 1960s, for example, only 
10 to 12% of public employees were unionized but, by the mid-1980s, member­
ship had risen to about 33 percent of all public employees. 
Executive Order 10988, signed by President Kennedy in 1962, formally 
recognized unions in the federal sector. According to most accounts, this ac­
tion was a catalyst at the state level where many laws were passed during the 
1960s and 1970s to permit and encourage public sector unions. During this peri­
od, public sector unions went through a major transition - from informal em­
ployee associations to full-fledged bargaining units with well-honed lobbying 
and public relations departments. This era witnessed the rise of high profile en­
tities, such as the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
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Employees, the National Education Association, and the American Federation 
of Teachers. 
Economic theory suggests that unions are organizations that provide public 
goods. Labor unions, through collective action, may be able to secure benefits 
that an individual might not be able to obtain. Based on public goods theory, 
we model how unions influence the supply of, and demand for, public spend­
ing. On the demand side, public sector unions are potent special interests that 
signal their preferences for public sector expansion to policy makers. On the 
supply side, public sector unions exert pressure to maintain and expand their 
monopoly powers. Vehement opposition to school-choice initiatives and 
privatization, as well as union efforts to increase collective bargaining strength 
and striker protection, attest to these efforts. 
While previous studies have concluded that various public sector unions 
have raised wages and employment for their members, our paper provides a 
model which suggests that public sector unions are also interested in expanding 
the overall role of the public sector in the economy. 1 In other words, we argue 
that preferences for public sector expansion are not limited to the labor mar­
kets in which union members are employed. Our model provides testable 
hypotheses about how unions affect the equilibrium size of the public sector. 
Empirical evidence at the state and local levels of governments during the 1980s 
supports the conclusion that a positive relationship exists between public sector 
unionism and public spending. 
2. Unions and public goods 
To understand how public sector unions influence the size of the public sector, 
it is useful to recognize that unions provide public goods to their members. In 
the parlance of public finance, public goods are nonrival in consumption. 
Benefits tend to be nonrival because, when membership grows, benefits are not 
reduced for any existing member. In effect, marginal costs of providing 
benefits to additional members are very low, if not zero. 
One benefit of organizing workers is the ability to generate large amounts 
of information on issues that affect members' interests. For example, while an 
individual may not find it advantageous to comb through thousands of pages 
of pertinent federal and state legislation, a union's small research team may 
cheaply produce clear and concise analysis through an informational arm of 
the union. When spread over thousands of members, the cost of this service 
is minimal for union members. Similarly, a union can hire lobbyists and public 
relations experts to advocate legislation that benefit members at small expense 
to each member. 
One potential problem is the free-rider effect: consumers of public goods 
have an incentive to free ride since it is difficult to exclude non-contributors 
from enjoying benefits. For example, establishing collective bargaining proce­
dures is a formidable task for unorganized workers. If union support is volun­
tary, participation may be minimal, even though a collective effort would 
result in net benefits for the group. One solution is a union that internalizes 
the free-rider problem through compulsory dues and other organizational 
means. In response to free-rider problems, unions can also provide goods that 
are nonrival or partially exclusive, such as technical and advisory services, pen­
sions, and data collection and analysis. Moreover, unions may lobby for 
favorable legislation that excludes nonunion members. 
3. The relative organizational advantages of public sector unions 
The major benefit of public sector unions are their ability to organize public 
sector employees into large voting and "grass roots" blocs that signal mem­
bers' desires to policy makers. The greater the number of members, the more 
powerful are these signals. In other words, public sector unions are special in­
terest groups (Olson, 1965). Public sector employees have powerful incentives 
to become politically active. By rallying employees for common purposes, un­
ions internalize free-rider effects that normally arise among unorganized wor­
kers. Benefits to organization are clear. For example, a citizens' initiative to 
cut taxes or cut public spending may threaten public sector wages or employ­
ment. A high level of political activism may be required to defeat such a meas­
ure. Unions deal with such situations by collecting monetary contributions and 
in-kind efforts from members. It is no secret that unions can be quite successful 
in handling such problems. Union participation in political fund-raising often 
approaches very high levels with participation often exceeding 80% of 
members (California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985). Public sec­
tor unions often outspend their opponents in such campaigns. 
As special interest groups, public sector workers are linked by common 
bonds: they may believe that their role in providing goods and services to the 
public requires more stability in their employment; they may believe that 
unionization will increase their pay and benefit packages; or they may believe 
that their unions can improve public policy. It has also been suggested that 
public sector unions are better able than ordinary citizens to understand service 
needs and to ensure efficient service provision (Zax and Ichniowski, 1988). 
Whatever the motivations, public sector unions are powerful pressure groups. 
Public sector unions may also have special advantages, relative to private 
sector unions, in organizing workers, as evidenced by union penetration 
trends. Public sector union membership rose from 900,000 in 1960 to 6.4 mil­
lion members in the 1980s. Public sector union penetration (the share of state 
and local public sector workers in unions) rose from 10.8% in 1960 to about 
37% in 1992. During the same approximate period, union penetration in the 
private sector fell from a high of 36% in 1953 to 16% in 1990 (Troy, 1988). 
Benefits and costs of collective action appear more favorable in the public 
sector. Favorable legal changes, which gained momentum in the 1960s, appear 
to have facilitated what is otherwise a natural and dynamic process of organiza­
tion among public sector employees. There are three possible reasons for why 
public sector unions may have organizational advantages over their private sec­
tor counterparts. First, public sector unions exist in less competitive environ­
ments. Ifwage gains exceed productivity gains in the private sector, the finan­
cial positions of both employees and managers are threatened; but, in the 
public sector, such pressures can be deflected by "tax push" - passing "exces­
sive" wage increases to taxpayers or increasing debt. In a study of comparable 
public and private sector jobs, Brunelli and Cox (1992) show that state and 
local public sector salaries have significantly outpaced private sector salaries 
during the past decade and that public sector salaries are generally higher than 
private sector salaries for comparable jobs. Public sector employees also face 
less pressure from competitive suppliers. Private sector employers can turn to 
other sources of labor supply or relocate to states or countries with lower labor 
costs, but these options are generally not available for public managers. Typi­
cally such action can be taken only by political action, such as privatization 
initiatives. Moreover, collective bargaining procedures in the public sector 
often cover nonunion employees as well, thus precluding nonunion employees 
from wage competition with union employees. 
Second, public employees vote more often than voters employed in the pri­
vate sector (see Bush and Denzau, 1977; Bennett and Orzechowski, 1983; and 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982). Bennett and Orzechowski (1983), for example, 
show that public sector employees participate in elections at a 40070 greater rate 
than private sector employees. This enables public sector employees to achieve 
greater political leverage on policy makers and increases the relative pay-off to 
organizing public employees. Third, with a loose connection between produc­
tivity and wages, public managers pose less resistance to unionization than pri­
vate sector managers. In effect, across-the-board wage increases are less harm­
ful to allocative efficiency in this "sheltered" labor market.2 
4. Unions and public sector size 
4.1 Demanders ofpublic programs 
Public sector employees are commonly believed to favor an expanding role for 
the public sector (Tullock, 1974; and Buchanan and Tullock, 1977). This view 
predicts that public sector unionism exerts a positive influence on demand for 
public programs through their voting and lobbying efforts. As casual support 
of this hypothesis, a strong positive correlation has been shown between per 
capita state debt and the scope of collective bargaining statutes (Indiana 
Chamber of Commerce, 1992). In states with no collective bargaining statutes, 
average per capita state debt was $916; but, in states where all public sector em­
ployees are covered by such statutes, average per capita state debt was 250 per­
cent higher, or $2,264 per resident. 
It should be noted that opposite motivations may explain why public em­
ployees favor public sector expansion. One view is that incomes and power of 
public employees rise with public sector expansion. The other view is that, be­
cause they genuinely believe they improve resource allocation in the economy, 
public employees feel that social welfare rises with expansion of their control 
over resource allocation. Notice that, although these views assume opposite 
motivations, both predict that public employees favor expansion of the public 
sector. 
4.2 Suppliers ofpublic programs 
Bureaucracy theory hypothesizes that public employees possess sufficient mo­
nopoly power over labor supply with which to expand public spending beyond 
levels desired by voters (Borcherding, Bush and Spann, 1977). This may occur 
for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most important stems from the mandatory 
collective bargaining status that most public sector unions possess. This status, 
along with the ability to pass "excessive" wage increases to the public through 
expansion of taxation or public debt, may rapidly expand public sector costs. 
Wages and benefits of public employees typically account for over 70 percent 
of state and local government budgets and such powers may expand public 
spending (Baird, 1991). Various studies have demonstrated that, when un­
ionized, public sector workers earn higher compensation and experience higher 
employment than when public sector workers are not unionized. For example, 
firefighters (Ashenfelter, 1971; Ichniowski, 1980; and Ehrenberg, 1973), 
teachers (Gallagher, 1978) and police officers (Trejo, 1991) have been shown 
to benefit from unionization in the public sector. Expenditures of municipali­
ties have also been shown to be positively influenced by unionization (Zax and 
Ichniowski, 1988). 
Another hypothesis attracts great attention. The price-effects hypothesis 
argues that, because government is less capital-intensive than the private sec­
tor, productivity in the public sector lags behind the private sector (Baumol, 
1967). Lower productivity is believed to be a result of the public sector being 
more service-oriented than the private sector. Even without expansion in num­
bers of programs, this hypothesis predicts that costs grow faster in the public 
sector. The price-effects hypothesis, in effect, offers a non-institutional theory 
of public sector expansion. Public sector expansion occurs "naturally" when 
public employees are lured from the more-productive private sector to work in 
the less-productive public sector. The "price-effects" hypothesis predicts that 
a natural cost-push dynamic is endemic to the public sector apart from institu­
tional biases. Notice that, if institutional elements, such as unionism, are not 
important influences on public sector size, then public sector expansion would 
not be strongly correlated to public sector unionism. However, if unionism is 
a statistically significant determinant of public sector size, institutional ele­
ments are important as well. 
s. An empirical model of public spending 
We have indicated how unionism may affect demand for, and supply of, public 
programs and, in this way, unionism is hypothesized to be positively related 
to the size of the public sector. Public sector size is measured by public spend­
ing in our empirical model. On the demand side, greater unionism is hypothe­
sized to lead to larger public sectors. On the supply side, greater unionism is 
hypothesized to lower supply and, along an inelastic demand, to rising public 
spending as well. 3 
The following models of public spending are estimated by OLS for 1983, 
1984, and 1985: 
EXPl j , EXP2 j = f(POP j , Yi' DENSITYj , CENj , GRANTS j , LIBERALj , 
UNEM j , UNIONl j ) (1) 
EXP I j , EXP2j = f(POPi j , Yj , DENSITYj • CENj , GRANTS j , LIBERALj • 
UNEM j , UNION2) (2) 
where 
spending of state and local governments as a percentage of 
gross state product; 
EXP2 j = per capita spending of state and local governments; 
POP·1 population in 1000s; 
PCYj = per capita personal income; 
URBANj = percentage of population that lives in urban areas; 
CENj = percentage of expenditures spent by state government; 
GRANTS j = federal grants as a percentage of revenues of state and local 
governments; 
LIBERALj = index of liberal tendencies of U.S. Senators; 
UNEMi = unemployment rate; 
UNIONli = percentage of wage and salary public employees who are 
union members; 
UNION2i = percentage of wage and salary public employees covered by a 
union contract. 
Two normalization specifications for public spending are considered: division 
by gross state product (GSP) and by population.4 Data (except GSPi, 
LIBERALi, UNIONl i and UNION2i) are obtained from appropriate years of 
the Statistical Abstract of the United States. Data on GSPi are obtained from 
U.S. Department of Commerce (1986). Estimation for three different periods, 
1983, 1984 and 1985, is based on ease of data availability. All states except 
Alaska and Hawaii are included in the data set. These two states appear to be 
outliers and are often excluded from studies that estimate public spending.5 
Significance of estimated coefficients is based on two-tailed tests at the .01, .05, 
and .10 levels. 
Per capita income (PCYi) is hypothesized to exert a positive influence on 
public spending. This expectation is based on Wagner's Law which argues that, 
as income in the industrialized economies grows, there is an increasing demand 
for public spending. Population (POP) and urban density (URBANi) are also 
demand-side variables and are hypothesized to exert positive influences on 
public spending.6 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) hypothesize that centralization influences 
public spending.7 This hypothesis follows from the Leviathan view of govern­
ment that assumes that policy makers are narrowly self-interested in their 
desire to expand the public sector. Under the Leviathan view, fiscal centraliza­
tion (CEN j ) indicates the monopoly power of policy makers and is hypothe­
sized to positively influence public spending. A counter hypothesis predicts 
that, because centralization allows governments to exploit economies of scale, 
a negative relationship exists between centralization and public spending 
(Oates, 1985). 
The Leviathan view has been extended to the relationship between inter­
governmental grants and public spending. If grants (GRANTS j ) lower financ­
ing burdens, as perceived by taxpayers, public spending may rise (Winer, 1983; 
and Logan, 1986) and a positive relationship is therefore hypothesized. There 
is a potential simultaneity problem, however, because some of the possible de­
terminants of federal grants are also included as regressors. An instrumental 
variable for grants is therefore estimated and used throughout the regressions 
reported in this paper. The following right-hand-side variables form the in­
strumental variable: PCYj , URBANj , UNEMi and the previous year's value of 
GRANTSi· 
LIBERALi is an index of the liberal tendencies of U.S. Senators provided 
Table 1. Summary statistics for 1985 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
SPENDING (070 OF GSP) 11.5 1.5 14.4 8.4 
SPENDING (per capita) 1815.6 367.3 3172.5 1264.4 
URBAN 63.4 22.4 100.0 19.1 
CENTRALIZATION 0.64 0.64 0.78 0.53 
GRANTS 0.19 0.04 0.31 0.12 
LIBERAL 45.93 26.94 93.50 0.00 
UNEM 7.06 1.94 13.00 3.90 
UNION1 34.67 17.16 71.00 5.80 
UNION2 41.72 18.02 79.70 8.40 
by the National Journal. s An index of 50, for example, means that a Senator 
is more liberal than 50 percent of the Senate on economic issues. This index 
controls for the possibility that, when states differ in their liberal tendencies, 
more liberal states might have both larger governments and be less resistant to 
public sector unions. 
UNEMi is the unemployment rate and controls for the expectation that pub­
lic sector unions do better in their representation elections and wage bargains 
during periods of economic expansion.9 In other words, the unemployment 
rate controls for the possibility that a positive relation between government size 
and public sector unionism simply reflects differences in economic perfor­
mance between states. 
UNIONl i and UNION2i are two alternative measures of public sector 
unionism. UNIONl i is the percentage of employed wage and salary workers 
who are union members and UNION2i is the percentage of employed wage 
and salary workers who are covered by union contracts. These data are pro­
vided in Curme, Hirsch and MacPherson (1990) and count employees who are 
either members of public sector unions or are covered by a union contract. Due 
to lack of data on UNIONl i for 1983, its value for 1984 is substituted for that 
year. Previous discussion leads us to hypothesize positive relationships between 
these variables and public spending. 
Table 1displays summary statistics for selected variables for 1985. As a share 
of GSP, the mean value of public spending is 11.5% and ranges from 8.4 
to 14.4070. Per capita public spending averages $1,815.60 and ranges from 
$1,264.40 to $3,172.50. UNIONl i ranges from 5.8% to 71 % and has a mean 
value of 34.7%. UNION2i ranges from 8.4 to 79.7% and has a mean value 
of 41.72%. Summary statistics of URBANi' CENi , GRANTSi, UEi and 
LIBERALi are also displayed. 
Table 2 displays results of regression analysis on public spending as a percen­
tage of GSP. Contrary to expectations, per capita income exerts negative, and 
Table 2. OLS estimations of public spending equations 
(Dependent variable: Spending as percentage share of aSP) 
1983 1984 1985 
Constant 18.90* 19.47* 22.12* 18.41 * 21.66* 21.43* 
4.35 4.81 5.15 4.37 4.03 4.21 
pey 
-.0004 - .0003 - .005** - .0004*** - .001 ** -.001** 
1.61 1.52 2.21 1.88 2.21 2.42 
POP -4E-05 -6E-05 -3E-05 -3E-05 -IE-05 -2E-05 
0.84 1.39 0.68 0.73 0.25 0.32 
URBAN -0.01 -0.01 - 0.03** -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
0.70 1.14 1.94 1.37 1.25 1.28 
CEN -0.70 -2.92 -0.47 0.27 1.00 0.78 
0.22 0.98 0.15 0.09 0.28 0.23 
GRANTS -0.19** -0.24* -0.29* -0.21** -0.24** -0.24** 
2.34 2.95 3.00 2.33 2.32 2.43 
LIBERAL 0.01 .0001 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.88 0.02 1.65 0.96 1.49 -1.52 
UNEM -0.026 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 
0.17 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.91 0.75 
UNION1 0.06* 0.07* 0.06* 
4.03 4.87 3.76 
UNION2 0.07* 0.07* 0.06* 
4.86 4.93 4.26 
R2 0.25 0.45 0.35 0.33 0.18 0.24 
s.e.e. 1.25 1.18 1.12 1.14 1.32 1.27 
F 3.00 4.05 4.20 3.91 2.29 2.84 
n 48 48 48 48 48 48 
t-statistics below estimated coefficients.
 
*, **, *** refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10070 levels (two-tailed tests) or greater.
 
significant, influences on spending in 1984 and 1985. Population and centrali­
zation are never found to exert statistically significant influences on spending. 
Urbanization exerts a statistically significant, and negative, influence in only 
one estimation. Contrary to expectations, grants exert negative, and generally 
significant, influences on public spending. The index of liberalism and the un­
employment rate are never found to influence public spending. Both measures 
of unionization always exert hypothesized positive, and highly significant, in­
fluences on public spending. 
Table 3 displays results of regression analysis on per capita public spending. 
Per capita income exerts the hypothesized positive, and significant, influence 
on spending in five of six regressions. While population and centralization con­
tinue to exert no significant influences, urbanization exerts, contrary to expec­
tations, negative and significant influences in all estimations. Similar to the 
previous table, grants generally exert negative and significant influences on 
Table 3. OLS estimations of public spending equations 
(Dependent variable: Per capita spending) 
1983 1984 1985 
Constant 1597.6** 1342.2 1675.1 ** 1261.7 961.6 923.6 
2.07 1.67 2.17 1.31 0.77 0.76 
PCY 0.10** 0.13* 0.10** 0.09 0.10** 0.10*** 
1.12 2.75 2.11 1.64 1.74 1.71 
POP -.003 -0.01 -.002 - .001 - .0001 -.001 
0.31 0.69 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.05 
URBAN -9.21* -9.35* -9.26** -7.58*** -6.99*** -6.94*** 
3.56 3.40 3.58 2.30 1.82 1.84 
CEN 324.9 151.3 476.9 306.9 434.2 400.3 
0.59 0.25 0.87 0.44 0.52 0.49 
GRANTS -56.2* - 57.1* -59.3* - 36.2*** -32.6 -32.6 
3.83 3.63 4.04 1.76 1.36 1.39 
LIBERAL -0.49 -1.02 0.14 -1.11 -1.45 -1.49 
0.33 0.63 0.09 0.57 0.65 0.67 
UNEM 12.65 21.75 8.64 5.91 27.57 31.94 
0.71 1.18 0.09 0.23 0.80 0.95 
UNION1 8.58* 9.58* 8.78** 
3.15 3.51 2.53 
UNION2 6.97** 10.01 * 9.13* 
2.32 3.10 2.81 
R2 0.51 0.46 0.55 0.38 0.30 0.32 
s.e.e. 222.7 233.8 222.6 263.1 307.1 302.2 
F 7.2 6.06 4.70 4.54 3.53 3.80 
n 48 48 48 48 48 48 
t-statistics below estimated coefficients.
 
*, **, *** refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels (two-tailed tests) or greater.
 
spending and the index of liberalism and the unemployment rate are never 
found to influence public spending. Both measures of unionization continue 
to exert positive, and highly significant, influences on spending. 
6. Empirical models of public employment and earnings 
Our discussion suggests that public sector unions are interested in increasing 
public sector wage bills. Employment and earnings are two potential avenues 
for expanding wage bills. The following models of public sector employment 
and earnings are estimated by OLS:10 
FTEi = f(POPi j , Yi' DENSITYj , CENj , GRANTS j , LIBERALj , UNEMj , 
UNIONl j ) (3) 
Table 4. OLS estimations of public employment and earnings equations 
Employment equations Earnings equations
 
FTE per 10,000 population Average annual (in thousands)
 
1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985
 
Constant 656.8* 829.5* 355.9*** 14.63* 22.50* 12.51 *** 
4.29 4.94 1.90 2.85 4.03 1.73 
PCY 0.01 -0.002 0.14 0.001*** 0.0002 -0.0005 
0.61 0.24 1.54 1.86 0.79 1.47 
POP -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001 7E-05 0.0001** 9E-05 
0.57 0.28 0.51 1.23 2.31 1.47 
URBAN -1.56* - 2.01 * -1.11*** -0.02 -0.04** 0.01 
3,49 3.64 1.93 0.97 2.06 0,40 
CEN 33,4 23,4 29,4 2.11 4.82 5.29 
0.31 0.20 0.23 0.57 1.27 1.13 
GRANTS -7.1** -10.2* -10.7 -0.28* -0,44* -0.18 
2.44 2.78 0.29 2.92 3.61 1.34 
LIBERAL 0.02 0.08 -0.29 .0004 0.01 -0.01 
0.04 0.27 0.85 0,45 0.84 0.61 
UNEM -1.80 -3.56 6.00 0.06 0.11 0.07 
0.50 1.85 1.16 0,47 0.78 0.60 
UNIONI -0.08 -0.27 0.53 0.07* 0.08* 0.07* 
0.15 0.52 1.02 3.86 4.67 3,44 
lP 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.68 0.71 0.63 
s.e.e. 44.2 42.7 46.2 1,48 1.42 1.73 
F 2.41 2.61 1.31 13.68 15.37 10.88 
n 48 48 48 48 48 48 
t-statistics below estimated coefficients.
 
*, **, *** refer to significance at 1, 5 and 100/0 levels (two-tailed tests) or greater.
 
EARNi = f(POPij> Yi' DENSITYi, CENi, GRANTSi' LIBERALi, UNEMi, 
UNIONIi) (4) 
where 
FTEi = state and local government employment on a full time equivalent 
basis; 
EARNi = average annual salary of (full-time) state and local government 
employees. 
Breaking out employment and earnings effects helps determine if public sector 
unions primarily push up wages or also attempt to raise the number of public 
employees. The former case would be suggested by a positive relation between 
unionism and earnings, and the latter case would be suggested by a positive 
relation between unionism and employment. Either would suggest that 
unionism raises the costs of providing goods and services through the public 
sector and therefore would be evidence of a supply-side cause behind the posi­
tive relationship between unionism and public sector spending. 
Table 4 displays OLS estimates of (3) and (4). Per capita income, centraliza­
tion, and population do not statistically influence public employment. Urbani­
zation, however, exerts a statistically significant, and negative, influence on 
employment in all three years. Grants exert a statistically significant, and nega­
tive, influence on employment in 1984 and 1985. The index of liberalism, the 
unemployment rate, and unionism never exert significant influences on public 
employment. Estimations of (4) show that, in general, per capita income, 
population, centralization, the index of liberalism, and unemployment are not 
significantly related to average salaries of government employees. Grants, 
however, exert statistically significant, and negative, influences in 1983 and 
1984. Public sector unionism exerts a highly significant, and positive, influence 
on salaries. 
Public sector unionism is therefore shown to exert no significant effect on 
employment, but a significant and positive influence on average salaries. These 
results therefore suggest that, because unions are successful in raising salaries 
of all government workers (unionized and not), unions are responsible for 
pushing up supply costs of public spending programs. 
7. Empirical model of functional spending 
It is well known that many state and local governments face within-period 
budget constraints with respect to non-capital spending. Tax, expenditure, and 
debt limitations have become increasingly common and pose potential 
problems for those groups, such as public sector unions, who are interested in 
expanding the public sector. A strong union may therefore attempt to shift the 
fraction of total public spending on cash transfers and entitlements like AFDC 
payments (that do not directly benefit the membership) to programs that are 
relatively heavy demanders of government workers such as education, protec­
tive services, etc. 
The following equations are estimated to test whether public sector unions 
favor any spending areas over other areas of spending: 
EDUCi = f(POPi i , Yi , DENSITYi , CENi , GRANTSi , LIBERALi , UNEMi , 
UNION1 i ) (5) 
HIGH j = f(POPii , Yi , DENSITYi , CENj , GRANTSi , LIBERALi , UNEM j , 
UNIONl) (6) 
Table 5. OLS estimations of functional spending categories, 1985 
Percentage of total spending Percentage of GSP 
Edu- High- Public Health & Edu- High- Public Health & 
cation ways Welfare Hospitals cation ways Welfare Hospitals 
Constant 75.2* 23.01 * -0.57 10.07 13.72* 4.37 1.25 1.84 
7.16 3.8S 0.05 0.88 5.38 3.40 0.74 1.17 
PCY -0.002* 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0005* -4E-05 -0.0001 -0.0001 
3.45 0.56 0.23 0.83 3.91 0.72 1.38 1.38 
POP 9E-05 -0.0002* 0.0002** 9E-05 -lE-06 -2E-05** 4E-05** IE-OS 
0.96 3.24 2.58 0.94 0.06 2.16 2.38 0.90 
URBAN -0.09* -0.09* 0.01 0.04 -0.02* -0.02* 0.0002 0.003 
2.83 5.09 0.58 1.21 2.94 4.51 0.04 0.70 
CEN 12.91*** -11.77* 5.43 -3.26 2.40 -1.49*** 0.81 -0.22 
1.86 2.99 0.80 0.43 1.42 1.76 0.72 0.21 
GRANTS -0.90* -0.02 0.20 0.11 -0.17* -0.01 0.14 0.01 
4.36 0.10 1.01 0.49 3.42 0.64 0.44 0.17 
LIBERAL 0.01 0.003 0.04** -0.04*** 0.01 .... 0.003 0.01* -0.004 
1.18 0.30 2.07 1.79 2.21 1.19 2.41 1.56 
UNEM -0.72** -0.01 -0.18 0.42 -0.15** -0.02 -0.06 0.06 
2.48 0.07 0.65 1.35 2.11 0.68 1.20 1.34 
UNION1 -0.03 -0.01 0.08* -0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.004 
1.12 0.42 2.83 0.49 2.87 1.52 4.36 0.99 
:R2 0.52 0.71 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.61 0.50 0.15 
s.e.e. 2.58 1.46 2.52 2.79 0.63 0.32 0.42 0.38 
F 7.27 15.22 6.11 2.08 5.98 10.40 6.88 2.05 
n 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
t-statistics below estimated coefficients.
 
*, **, "'** refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10070 levels (two-tailed tests) or greater.
 
PUBWELi = f(POPi i • Yi' DENSITYj • CENi' GRANTS j • LIBERALi • 
UNEM j • UNIONl j ) (7) 
HEALTHi = f(POPii• Yi• DENSITYj , CENi• GRANTS j • LIBERALi• 
UNEMi • UNIONl j ) (8) 
where 
EDUC j = education spending of state and local governments 
HIGH j highway spending of state and local governments 
PUBWELj = public welfare spending of state and local governments12 
HEALTH j = health and hospital spending of state and local governments. 
Spending on these functional categories are normalized two ways: as percen­
tages of state and local government spending and as percentages of GSP. Esti­
mations by OLS in Table 5 are for 1985.12 
Discussion focuses on the effects of the liberalism, unemployment, and 
union variables because the effects of other variables generally mirror those of 
previous estimations. The degree of liberalism exerts a positive and statistically 
significant influence on the share of public spending devoted to public welfare 
and for the percentages of GSP devoted to education and public welfare. A sig­
nificant, and inverse, influence is found between liberalism and the share of 
spending devoted to health and hospitals. The unemployment rate exerts a 
statistically significant, and negative, influence only on education spending 
(under both specifications). Unionism is found to exert a significant and posi­
tive influence on public welfare spending (under both specifications) and on the 
education spending share of GSP. 
These results do not suggest support of the hypothesis that public sector un­
ions attempt to shift a greater portion of spending away from transfers and 
toward spending areas that are more heavily dominated by government em­
ployees. While no effects are shown between unionism and spending on high­
ways and health and hospitals, the results show that, with the exception of the 
share of total spending devoted to education, stronger public sector unions ap­
pear to favor spending on public welfare programs. 
8. Conclusion 
The hypothesized positive influence between unionism and public spending 
was derived from our model of how public sector unions affect the demand for, 
and supply of, government. On the demand side, public sector unions are spe­
cial interest groups who lobby for expansion of the public sector. On the supply 
side, unions adversely affect productivity and raise costs of providing goods 
through the public sector. The prediction that public sector unions exert a posi­
tive influence on public spending is strongly supported by our empirical analy­
sis of the relationship between union membership and spending of state and 
local governments. Evidence is also shown to support the hypotheses that 
unions promote higher salaries and, in this way, supports the supply-side hypo­
thesis that unions raise (salary) costs of providing goods and services through 
the public sector. Public sector unionism is also found to be positively related 
to spending on public welfare programs. 
Notes 
l. For example, firefighters (Ashenfelter, 1971) teachers (Gallagher, 1978) and police officers 
(Trejo, 1991) have been shown to benefit from unionization. 
2. This may also explain why private sector unionism appears to have declined since the 1970s. 
For example. Reder (1988) argues that increases in private sector unionization in the 1950s and 
1960s are the result of favorable economic trend since, in effect, unions easily ratify market­
determined wages in periods of general prosperity. 
3. Studies indicate that the elasticity of demand for public programs is roughly - .40, which is 
highly price inelastic (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; and Borcherding and Deacon, 1972). 
4. Because grants are controlled for on the right-hand side of the equations, and to avoid double­
counting, they are substracted from state and local government spending. 
5. Exclusion of these two states does not affect the results when public spending as a share of 
GSP is estimated. Coefficients on UNIONI and UNION2 are never statistically different from 
zero in regressions of per capita public spending when the two states are included. 
6.	 Musgrave and Musgrave (1988) argue that population increases increase the demand for educa­
tional and· public services and increasing urban density raises demand for infrastructure. 
7. See Joulfaian and Marlow (1991) for a review ofthe empirical literature on this hypothesis. 
8. The simple average of the 1986 scores for both Senators in each state is used. 
9. Two other variables were considered to control for interstate differences in economic perfor­
mance following the 1981-82 recession: changes in unemployment rates from 1982 and real 
annual growth in GSP since 1982. Since neither were any more statistically significant than the 
current unemployment rate, we do not display regressions with these alternative control 
variables. 
10.	 Estimations with UNION2j were also conducted but are not shown here because they do not 
alter the empirical results. 
11.	 Public welfare spending includes support of and assistance to needy persons contingent on 
their need; e.g., cash assistance payments directly to needy persons under categorical and other 
welfare programs; vendor payments made directly to private purveyors for medical care, buri­
als, and other services provided under welfare programs by welfare institutions. Services 
directly included under the category "Health" below are not included here. 
12.	 Estimations of these equations for 1983 and 1984, and with UNION2, were also conducted 
but, because they show similar results, are not reported here. 
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